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Abstract 
This article examines Egyptian-Soviet relations in the run up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It 
argues that Egypt and the Soviet Union stumbled into brinkmanship with little coordination and 
no agreement on common objectives or goals. The article demonstrates how frustration and 
mutual disappointment were recurring features of the interactions between the two allies during 
the critical weeks prior to the war. In doing so, the article exposes new aspects of how Cairo and 
Moscow managed their alliance and assesses what that means to our understanding of the origins 
of this transformative war. These conclusions challenge revisionist accounts that attribute the 
start of the war to Egyptian-Soviet collusion and some traditional narratives that present the 
Soviet Union as an enterprising risk-taker invested in regional brinkmanship. The article draws 
heavily on Egyptian and Arabic language sources to examine Egyptian-Soviet interactions 
during this key period of Middle Eastern history.  
 
Keywords: Arab-Israeli Conflict, Alliance, Cold War, Egypt, Soviet Union, Israel, Nasser  
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Allies at arm’s length: Redefining Egyptian-Soviet relations in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war 
 
Introduction  
 
In the early hours of the 5th of June 1967, Israel launched a coordinated air attack against 
Egyptian airbases, destroying most of the country’s air force. Shortly afterwards, Israeli ground 
forces stormed Sinai. They cut through Egyptian defences and, within a few days, reached the 
Eastern banks of the Suez Canal. Not only was the war a military defeat for Egypt’s armed forces 
and a political disaster for Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, but it was also a considerable 
setback for Soviet prestige. The Soviet Union was a partner in many of Nasser’s industrialisation 
projects and Egypt’s main source of arms and military training. In fact, Cairo had been 
Moscow’s most important ally in a key Cold War theatre.  
 
On the 50th anniversary of the 1967 war in the Middle East, this article unpacks Egyptian-Soviet 
relations throughout the crisis preceding the war. In so doing, it reveals a new interpretation of 
the role that this relationship played in the start of the war. Through engagement with Egyptian 
sources, this article argues that Egypt and the Soviet Union stumbled into brinkmanship with 
little coordination and no agreement on common objectives or goals. The study demonstrates 
how mistrust and mutual frustration between the two allies was an important feature of their 
relationship during a crucial period in the history of the Middle East. Contrary to theories that 
attribute the start of the war to Egyptian-Soviet collusion, this article presents a picture of 
dysfunctional communication between two allies that left them frequently at cross-purposes 
during the crisis.  
 
The article starts by examining various theories describing Soviet involvement at the start of the 
war. It then investigates the role intelligence shared between Moscow and Cairo about Israeli 
mobilisation might have played in escalating tensions. Subsequently, the article examines how 
Egypt and the Soviet Union managed their relationship throughout the crisis, using of Egyptian 
sources to determine the extent to which Moscow was involved in Cairo’s escalatory decisions 
and Soviet reactions to them. The analysis then examines how Egypt and the Soviet Union 
discussed the crisis during a key visit by an Egyptian ministerial delegation to Moscow. Finally, 
the article explores arms discussions, and the possibility of a first strike, before summarizing the 
main findings, building on them to suggest the importance of re-examining the nature and 
trajectory of Egyptian-Soviet relations in light of this war.  
 
In writing the history of Egyptian-Soviet relations, historians have predominantly relied on 
Soviet sources, while Egyptian sources have remained tangential to, or, in many cases, even 
absent from the analysis. This article primarily addresses this gap by consulting old and new 
Egyptian sources to examine interactions between Cairo and Moscow during the crisis. This 
includes research interviews conducted by the author with Egypt’s war minister during the crisis, 
Shams Badran, as well as Badran’s unpublished memoirs. The study also incorporates sources 
from emerging Egyptian platforms, such as the presidential archival collections held by the new 
library of Alexandria, as well as sources obtained from private archival collections. In addition, it 
uses transcripts of interviews with Egyptian officials held in the Liddell Hart Archives in King’s 
College London. Egypt has a long and active tradition of published political memoirs providing 
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first-hand accounts of the events; many of these memoirs contain useful annexes that reproduce 
official documents. These proved to be particularly valuable for this study. The explosion of TV 
broadcasting in the Arab world has also made new, rich testimonies available. These testimonies, 
whenever possible, were triangulated and crosschecked to minimise the influence of bias and 
self-serving narratives. 
 
The Soviet Union and the origins of the 1967 war: Innocent, risk-taker, or scheming? 
 
Understanding Egyptian-Soviet relations is key to understanding the various explanations of the 
origins of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The question of whether the Soviet Union encouraged its 
ally to escalate and therefore precipitate a war has long been a matter of controversy. On the face 
of it, the Soviet Union not only had key interests in the region, but also considerable leverage. 
Moscow had strong relations with Cairo and Damascus: two important regional capitals directly 
involved in the crisis. In addition, Soviet leadership had a growing interest in establishing a naval 
presence in the warm waters of the Mediterranean.1 Broader considerations of a global balance 
with the United States and the strategic importance of the Middle East all amplified the Soviet 
Union’s stakes in the region. Further feeding speculation of Soviet involvement in the crisis was 
the country’s provision of intelligence to Cairo, and possibly Damascus, which suggested the 
mobilisation of Israeli forces along the borders with Syria. Such intelligence proved to be a wild 
exaggeration at best or, at worst, a complete falsehood.  
 
Scholars investigating the origins of the 1967 war can be broadly divided into three main groups, 
depending on their assessment of the role that the Soviet Union played in influencing Egyptian 
decision-makers in the run-up to the war. The first group agrees that the Soviet Union was not 
interested in starting an Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East.2 According to this view, the Soviet 
Union was keen to maintain its détente with the US and had no intention of stirring up regional 
tensions. As Galia Golan puts it, war was a ‘no-win proposition’ for the Soviet Union.3 Moscow 
reacted in good faith, if sometimes clumsily, to support its allies at a time of regional tensions. 
Accordingly, this was a case in which the Soviet Union was drawn into a regional conflict, rather 
than initiating it. More recently, Guy Laron’s take on the crisis provides further nuance. He 
suggests that, during the crisis, Soviet diplomacy had tried to ‘calm the waters’ and reduce 
regional tensions, but that the Soviet military opportunistically sought to use the crisis to get 
access to Egyptian naval facilities.4 In short, not all Soviet institutions carefully toed the line. 
 
																																								 																				
1 Galia Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 8, 
no. 1 (2006): 3–19; Yaacov Ro’i and Boris Morozov, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War 
(Washington, D.C.; Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 2008), 144–71; 
Jesse Ferris, “Guns for Cotton? Aid, Trade, and the Soviet Quest for Base Rights in Egypt, 1964–1966,” Journal of 
Cold War Studies 13, no. 2 (2011): 4–38. 
2 Richard B. Parker, “The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored,” Middle East Journal 46, no. 2 (1992): 177–
197; Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War”; Guy Laron, “Playing with Fire: 
The Soviet–Syrian–Israeli Triangle, 1965–1967,” Cold War History 10, no. 2 (2010): 163–184. 
3 Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War,” 7–8. 
4 Guy Laron, The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East (Yale University Press, 2017), 243–44. 
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A second group viewed the Soviet Union as supporting brinkmanship and seeking to stoke 
regional tensions, but not intentionally pushing for war.5 According to this view, war happened, 
in part, because of Soviet imprudence and adventurism that led to unintended consequences. Ro’i 
concludes that the Soviet Union actively sought a ‘controlled’ crisis, but Moscow’s plan 
backfired as it failed to control regional escalation.6 According to Michael Oren, the Soviets 
wanted to maintain a ‘heightened level of tension in the area’ to ensure that Arab states would 
continue to need their assistance.7 Avi Shlaim suggests that the Soviet Union was driven by 
hopes of ‘making some political gains’ through demonstrating their commitment to Arab states 
and assailing US pro-Israel positions.8 Kenny Kolander, however, sees the Soviet role in passive, 
rather than active, terms; the Soviet Union ‘did not try very hard’ to prevent the escalating crisis. 
This was because the Soviet aim was ‘undermining American relations with Arab states’, given 
the close relationship between the US and Israel.9  
 
A third group posits that the Soviet Union deliberately created the crisis with a view to starting a 
regional war under the assumption that its allies would have the upper hand on the battlefield. 
According to this analysis, the Soviet scheme failed because its leaders overestimated the 
strength of their Arab allies and underestimated Israel’s military capabilities. A strong proponent 
of this view is the revisionist account of the start of the war provided by Isabella Ginor and 
Gideon Remez in several publications.10 According to them, both Moscow and Cairo 
manufactured the crisis as a pretext for eliminating Israel’s growing nuclear capability, which 
was a serious concern for both countries. Avner Cohen and Shlomo Aaronson also highlight the 
nuclear dimension of the crisis preceding the war, but both scholars situate the nuclear issue 
within the broader Arab-Israeli context and do not reach Ginor and Remez’ conclusions 
regarding a secret Soviet role.11  
 
Implicit in these various analyses and narratives on the origins of the war are a number of key 
assumptions. These include a larger assessment of whether the Soviet Union was a status quo or 
a revisionist international power in the Middle East. However, it is also crucial to remember that 
these different theories rest on certain assumptions about the nature of Egyptian-Soviet relations 
and their interactions during the crisis preceding the war. Was this a typical patron-client 
relationship? What leverage did each actor have, and how did their interaction influence the 
crisis’s outcomes? This research explores these questions by tracing the major milestones of 
Egyptian-Soviet interactions from the early phase of the crisis to the start of the war. 
																																								 																				
5 Bergman, Ronen “How the K.G.B. Started the War That Changed the Middle East” New York Times, 7 June 2017 
6 Ro’i and Morozov, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, xxi, 39. 
7 Michael B Oren, Six Days of War: The June 1967 War and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 55. 
8 Avi Shlaim, “The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars,” in Explaining International Relations Since 
1945, 1996, 219–240. 
9 Kenny Kolander, “The 1967 Arab–Israeli War: Soviet Policy by Other Means?,” Middle Eastern Studies 52, no. 3 
(2016): 403. 
10 Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (Yale 
University Press, 2008); Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over 
Dimona: The USSR’s Motive for Instigating the Six-Day War,” Israel Studies 11, no. 2 (2006): 88–130. 
11 Avner Cohen, “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War,” Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (April 1, 1996): 190–210; 
S. Aronson, “Israel’s Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and Its Ramifications,” Israel Affairs 6, no. 3–4 (2000): 
83–95. 
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In addressing these questions, the history of the war to this point has relied heavily on Soviet 
sources. The partial relaxation of government control over Soviet archives following the end of 
the Cold War provided strong insights into aspects of relations between Moscow and Cairo, if 
only from the Soviet perspective. These documents have also shed some light on how Soviet 
leadership approached their allies in Cairo as regional tensions escalated in May 1967. This 
included the publication of two volumes in 2003 that contained a selection of official documents 
from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.12 Previous studies have supplemented these with the 
use of Soviet testimonies and memoirs; in combination, these sources have provided valuable, if 
incomplete, insights on how the Soviet Union approached its relations with Cairo during the 
crisis.  
 
The opening up of certain Eastern European archives has provided an extra window onto 
Egyptian-Soviet relations. The Cold War International History Project published a translated 
speech given by Leonid Brezhnev to the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee that 
provided an insider account of how the Soviet leadership reacted to the Middle East crisis.13 
Ginor and Remez argue that the official documentary trail is insufficient to explain the unfolding 
crisis because of Soviet cover-ups.14 Instead, in challenging the conventional history of the war, 
they rely on a number of Soviet testimonies and an unconventional interpretation of released 
Soviet documents to suggest that Moscow had plans to fan the flames of existing tensions, then 
militarily intervene in, the crisis. In many areas, Ginor and Remez’s bold theory suffers from 
evidentiary gaps and frequent use of conjecture that others have highlighted.15 Furthermore, they 
do not sufficiently engage with Egyptian sources or narratives of the crisis, despite the 
significance their theory assigns to Egyptian-Soviet collusion. 
The origins of the 1967 war and Soviet intelligence 
 
Under Nasser’s instructions, the Egyptian high military command announced on the 14th of May 
that they were putting the armed forces on alert and deploying troops to Sinai. These decisions 
came as a surprise to the Egyptian military, which had neither planned for nor anticipated a 
military confrontation with Israel, particularly given the significant number of Egyptian forces 
fighting in Yemen.16 Most accounts of the start of the 1967 war assign heavy significance to 
Soviet-supplied information referring to the mobilisation of several Israeli brigades on the Syrian 
border. Such accounts claim that this spurred Cairo into action and set in motion a series of 
events that led to the outbreak of war on the 5th of June. This information is now known to be 
																																								 																				
12 V. V. Naumkin, ed., Blizhnevostochnyi konºik 1957–1967: Iz dokumentov Arkhiva vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, 2 vols. (Moscow: Materik, 2003) 
13 “On Soviet Policy following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East,” June 20, 1967, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) KC PZPR 2632, pp. 358-408. Obtained by Krzysztof 
Persak and translated by Gennady Pasechnik. 
14 Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "The Six-Day War as a Soviet initiative: New evidence and methodological 
issues." MERIA (Middle East Review of International Affairs) 12 (2008). 
15 Galia Golan, “A (Dubious) Conspiracy Theory of the 1967 War,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 4 (September 1, 
2008): 669–73. 
16 Muḥammad Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970: mudhakkirāt al-Farīq Awwal Muḥammad Fawzī, Wazīr 
al-Ḥarbīyah al-Asbaq. (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Mustaqbal al-ʻArabī, 1986), 69. 
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false; Israel had not amassed troops on the Syrian border. Was this a grave but unintentional 
mistake by Soviet intelligence? Or did the Soviet Union intentionally seek to push Cairo into an 
armed conflict with Israel through an exaggeration of the Israeli threat to Syria? This paper 
argues that Cairo took mobilisation orders against, and not according to, Soviet advice. 
Therefore, focusing on Soviet intelligence obscures an understanding of the true causes that led 
to the start of the war. This study attributes a different role to that information in the start of the 
crisis by arguing that it was an important—but not decisive—factor in Egyptian decision-
making. To support this argument, this section proposes two alternative factors that explain 
Nasser’s decision to mobilise Egyptian troops in Sinai.  
 
Egyptian testimonies and sources indicate that Moscow sent its intelligence to Cairo through 
three different routes. On the 13th of May, the Soviet Ambassador delivered the information to 
the Egyptian ministry of foreign affairs.17 On the same day, the Soviet intelligence liaison officer 
in Cairo, known by the alias of Sergey, delivered that same information to the Egyptian 
Intelligence Agency, the Mokhabarat.18 Finally, the information was provided to Anwar Sadat, 
at the time Speaker of the Egyptian Parliament, who happened to be traveling in Moscow with a 
parliamentary delegation.19 Importantly, none of these routes led directly to Nasser, who 
frequently met with the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo. Instead, the Soviet government opted to 
deliver their intelligence through lower official channels. 
 
Records of the meetings in Cairo where the Soviet warning was delivered have not been 
released. Yet the report of the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow, Mourad Ghaleb, is now 
publicly available. Ambassador Ghaleb shadowed Sadat in his meetings with the Soviet Union 
and cabled Cairo reporting on these discussions directly after they ended.20 Ghaleb’s report 
provides a clear indicator of the nature and tone of the Soviet message provided to Cairo. 
According to Ghaleb’s report, dated the 13th of May: 
 
Semyonov mentioned that Israel is preparing a new attack on Syria 
using land and air forces . . . They [the Soviet Government] knew 
from sources inside Israel that the time for such an attack is between 
17 and 21 May. They advice repeat advice that UAR be ready but 
calm and not be drawn into a war with Israel. They advise Syria to be 
calm and not give Israel the pretext to launch military operations by 
making aggressive or extremist announcements against Israel.’ 21 
 
																																								 																				
17 Bassiouny, Salah. Fify Years War Transcript. 25 February 1997. Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives 
18 Muhạmmad Hạsanayn Heikal, Al-Infijar, 1967, Hạrb Al-Thalāthīn Sanah. (Markaz al-Ahrām lil-Tarjamah wa-al-
Nashr, 1990), 445. 
19 Anwar Sadat, Al-Bahṭh ʻan Al-Dhāt : Qisṣạt Hạyātī / (al-Qāhirah : al-Maktab al-Misṛī al-Hạdīth, 1978), 168; 
Heikal, Al-Infijar, 1967, 446; Maḥmūd Riyāḍ, Mudhakkirāt Maḥmūd Rīyāḍ (1948-1978): [al-baḥth ʻan al-salām. 
wa-al-ṣirāʻ fī al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Mustaqbal al-ʻArabī, 1986), 45. 
20 Ghaleb, Murad. Episode 7. Shahed ‘ala ‘asr. Aljazeera. 29 December 2008. Television 
21 ‘Memorandum from Ambassador Muran Ghaleb to Presidency’  13 May 1967. Foreign Ministry Archives. 
Egyptian National Archives. Photocopy produced in Fathy Mamdoh. Misr min Al-thawra Ela Al-naksa (Abu Dhabi: 
Markaz El-Imarat Dirasat wal Bohoth Al-Istrategya) 2003, 415 
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Ghaleb’s report carried a clear message to Cairo about the course of action the Soviets preferred. 
Rather than this being a rushed a call for arms issued by the Soviet Union to its regional allies in 
Cairo and Damascus, Moscow was rather urging a calm-headed and restrained approach in 
response to the information at the Soviets’ disposal. This was a clear warning against 
provocation into a military confrontation with Israel. This Soviet position was in fact something 
with which Cairo was already familiar, and was consistent with Moscow’s position when 
tensions between Israel and Syria had begun to flare up months earlier. Muhạmmad Hạsanayn 
Heikal cites several occasions when Cairo was urged by the Soviet Union to intervene with the 
Syrians to calm their nerves and moderate their reactions to Israeli provocations.22 When Nasser 
took the decision on the night of the 13th of May to mobilise the Egyptian armed forces and 
move them into Sinai, he did so contrary to Soviet advice for restraint.  
 
Soviet intentions aside, there are grounds on which to question the significance of the Soviet 
warning as a precipitator for war. First, this was not the first time that Moscow had supplied 
Egypt with information or intelligence suggesting aggressive intent. Throughout 1966 and as late 
as April 1967, these warnings had become a common occurrence.23 None of these previous 
warnings materialised into an all-out Israeli attack on Syria. Second, although Ghaleb’s report 
did not reference a specific number of mobilised Israeli brigades, the literature frequently refers 
to 10-15 brigades. This number is very high and could not realistically be achieved without 
calling in the Israeli reserve, which Egypt had been closely following over the years. Third, both 
Egypt’s Chief of Staff, Mohamed Fawzi ,and Egyptian intelligence challenged Soviet 
intelligence the day after it was received. Fawzi was sent to Syria on a 24-hour mission to 
investigate allegations about Israeli mobilisation.24 This indicates that Cairo did not take Soviet 
information for granted and sought to independently verify its accuracy. Ultimately, Fawzi’s 
findings from his field visit contradicted Soviet-supplied information.  
 
Fawzi found ‘no material evidence’ of an unusual Israeli ground mobilisation and presented a 
report with his findings on his return to Cairo.25 In Syria, Fawzi met with Syrian military 
leadership, who denied the Soviet intelligence. For added confirmation, Fawzi requested a visit 
to the Israeli-Syrian front and personally checked the most recent Syrian reconnaissance reports. 
By the evening of the 14th of May, Egyptian military intelligence revised an earlier assessment, 
concluded that the risk of an imminent Israeli attack was low, and warned against being 
provoked into an unnecessary war.26 Fawzi’s refutation of the Soviet information did not make 
any tangible difference in Cairo’s approach to the crisis. Rather than freeze or roll back its 
military actions, Cairo continued on a path of escalation. This suggests that Cairo’s approach to 
the crisis was influenced by factors beyond a simple automatic response to a Soviet warning of 
Israeli mobilisation.  
 
																																								 																				
22 Heikal, Al-Infijar, 1967, 442. 
23 Golan, “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War,” 5. 
24 Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970, 71; ʻAbd al-Muhsin Kamil Murtaji, Al-Farīq Murtajī Yarwī Al-
Hạqā’iq : Qaʻid Jabhat Sinā’ Fī Hạrb 1967 ([Beirut] : al-Waṭan al-ʻArabī, 1970), 54. 
25 Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970, 71 Fawzi also mentioned that he could not exclude Israeli air force 
mobilisation which he had no capacity to verify in his report. See: “Former Egyptian War Minister Uncovers to Al-
Wasat the Secrets Behind the Big Defeat” Al-Wasat 1992 . 
26 Murtaji, Al-Farīq Murtajī Yarwī Al-Hạqā’iq, 64. 
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Rather than explaining Nasser’s actions through a singular focus on the Soviet warning, this 
article suggests two alternative frameworks for understanding Nasser’s motivations in giving 
orders to mobilise the armed forces. Memoirs of former Egyptian officials universally emphasise 
the role of repeated Israeli public threats to Syria as a key factor in shaping Nasser’s view of the 
crisis.27 These public threats were given by officials in high positions in the Israeli government, 
including not only Yitzhak Rabin, the Chief of Staff, but also Foreign Minister Abba Eban and 
Premier Levi Eshkol.28 These threats were interpreted in Cairo as a sign of aggressive Israeli 
intent and, crucially, as a threat undermining Nasser’s public stature in the Arab world. Egypt 
had already signed a five-year common defence agreement with Syria in November 1966 against 
a background of Israeli-Syrian tensions and border skirmishes. Therefore, Israel’s public threats 
against Syria directly undermined Nasser and compelled him to action. Nasser had already been 
under pressure for failing to protect Syria and Jordan from Israeli attacks. That criticism not only 
came from radical Arabs pushing for a more militant and confrontational approach to Israel, but 
it also came from conservative regimes allied with the West, including Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 
Both states accused Nasser of empty rhetoric and hiding behind UN forces stationed in Sinai.29 
As US reports from regional capitals suggest, Nasser was ‘raked over the coals’ for not 
defending Arab states threatened by Israel.30 
 
In addition to pressures on Nasser to assert authority and respond to threats to Syria, it is likely 
that Nasser saw an opportunity in the unfolding of regional tensions. Egyptian leadership had 
never fully reconciled itself with the post-Suez war settlement. In particular, they resented the 
presence of international troops in Sinai, described by Fawzi as a ‘breach to Egyptian 
sovereignty over its territories,’ as well as the loss of navigation rights in the Aqaba gulf.31 The 
issue of UN troops was raised at least as early as 1964 in the context of Arab League discussions 
on common Arab defence.32 Egypt frequently faced criticism that the presence of such forces 
hindered its contribution to joint Arab defence plans.33 As the frequency of Israeli raids against 
Jordan and Syria increased, Cairo was derided for ‘hiding’ behind UN troops as Israel attacked 
other Arab states.34 Nasser reportedly described the presence of these troops as ‘an abscess that 
needed to be cut open’.35 Before the crisis, both Nasser and Amer had already begun to consider 
when—not if—the presence of UN troops in Sinai could be terminated. Fawzi claims to have 
																																								 																				
27 Heikal, Al-Infijar, 1967, 433, 446; Muḥammad Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970: mudhakkirāt al-
Farīq Awwal Muḥammad Fawzī, Wazīr al-Ḥarbīyah al-Asbaq. (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Mustaqbal al-ʻArabī, 1986), 69; 
Maḥmūd Riyāḍ, Mudhakkirāt Maḥmūd Rīyāḍ (1948-1978): [al-baḥth ʻan al-salām. wa-al-ṣirāʻ fī al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ 
(al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Mustaqbal al-ʻArabī, 1986), 45; ʻAbd al-Muhsin Kamil Murtaji, Al-Farīq Murtajī Yarwī Al-
Hạqā’iq : Qaʻid Jabhat Sinā’ Fī Hạrb 1967 ([Beirut] : al-Waṭan al-ʻArabī, 1970), 49–50. 
28 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. (New York; London: 
Random House, 1999), 304; Shlaim, “The Middle East,” 24; Eyal Ziser, “June 1967: Israel’s Capture of the Golan 
Heights,” Israel Studies 7, no. 1 (2002): 175–77. 
29 Clea Lutz Bunch, “Strike at Samu: Jordan, Israel, the United States, and the Origins of the Six-Day War,” 
Diplomatic History 32, no. 1 (2008): 69–70. 
30 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis And War, 1967. 
‘Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson.’ 17 May 1967. Document 7 
31 Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970, 69. 
32 Heikal, Al-Infijar, 1967, 457. 
33 Heikal, 204–7; Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970, 72. 
34 Badran, Shams. Personal Interview with author. 4 April 2017 
35 Huwayidi. Adhwa’ ‘ala Naksa w Iztenzaf’ (Beirut: Dar Eltalya), 1975, 22  
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witnessed several occasions in 1965 and 1966 on which the presence of UN troops was raised in 
discussions between Nasser and Amer.36 Furthermore, Heikal describes how, in 1966, an internal 
working group was formed and prepared draft letters requesting the removal of these forces in 
anticipation of such a decision being taken in the future.37 All this indicates that the issue had 
been a pressing concern for Cairo, and that both Nasser and Amer were waiting for the right time 
to address the issue.  
 
In unpacking the forces pushing Cairo into action in May, the role and influence of the Soviet 
Union appears to be marginal rather than central, inviting a reconsideration of the role Moscow 
played in the war. The only available record of the Soviet warning is an Egyptian memo that 
clearly shows that Moscow advised Nasser to exercise restraint—advice that Nasser ignored. A 
focus on the Soviet warning as the main driver for Egyptian actions cannot be reconciled with 
the outcome of Fawzi’s visit to the Israeli-Syrian border that verified the lack of Israeli 
mobilisation, and which was later supported by Egyptian intelligence’s assessment. An analysis 
of available sources suggests two alternative reasons for Cairo’s actions: pressure on Nasser to 
visibly respond to Israel’s public threats (which risked undermining his prestige), and a desire to 
revisit the outcome of the 1956 Suez war that ended with the stationing of foreign troops on 
Egyptian territory and the reversal of Egypt’s earlier control of the entrance to the Gulf of 
Aqaba. Consequently, the Soviet warning can be seen as a contributing factor that validated, 
rather than shaped, Egyptian assessments on the need to act.  
Allies out of sync 
 
In quick succession, Cairo took one step after another that unwittingly brought it within reach of 
Israeli fire. These actions appear to be less the product of a well-formed Egyptian scheme and 
more the result of improvisation. There are no indications that Cairo sought the input of the 
Soviet Union in advance of any of the decisions it took during the crisis. Troops deployed in 
Sinai were asked to march through Egyptian cities; in the process, they stirred up a patriotic 
frenzy of overconfidence in Egypt’s military. Arab public opinion applauded Nasser for standing 
up to the Israeli challenge and defending Arab rights. Egyptian leadership became prisoner to 
this momentum. Throughout this process, the Soviet Union appears to be absent. Furthermore, an 
unexpected complication with the UN further pushed Nasser to further escalation. On the 16th of 
May, Egypt requested the removal of UN forces along the Egyptian-Israeli border, deliberately 
excluding forces stationed in Gaza and Sharm El Sheikh from its request.38 When presented with 
the Egyptian request, U Thant insisted that the UN forces should operate as one indivisible 
unit.39 Realising that it could not now step back without losing face, Cairo demanded the full 
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withdrawal of all UN troops, further exacerbating the crisis and opening up the question of 
navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.40  
 
The Gulf of Aqaba is strategically crucial, as it provides the only maritime route to the Israeli 
port of Eilat. The only entrance to the Gulf is through the Tiran Strait, which is controlled from 
the Egyptian town of Sharm El Sheikh. Israeli ships only started using the waterway after the its 
occupation of Sinai in the 1956 war and have continued to do so since. Egypt’s initial 
deployment of troops to Sinai did not include the assignment of troops to Sharm El Sheikh; 
Cairo’s request for limited withdrawal indicates that no decision had been taken to alter status 
quo. Fawzi and Murtagi mention that the Egyptian armed forces were reluctant to deploy to 
Sharm. Nevertheless, political and military leadership did not see eye-to-eye on the issue, and the 
military’s reluctance was overridden by a political decision taken by Nasser and Amer.41  
 
With Egyptian troops controlling the southern entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba, Nasser called an 
urgent meeting of the High Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) at his 
private residence to consider the question of Israel’s access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Various 
accounts of the meeting recount how the assembled were overwhelmingly in favour of 
prohibiting Israel from using the waterway, while aware that such a decision was confrontational 
and risky, as it might provoke Israel into military action.42 When it came to the vote, all but one 
agreed to block Israel’s access to the Gulf.43  
 
This was not the finest hour for Egyptian-Soviet relations. As Egypt was inching closer to a war 
it had not planned for, the Soviet Union appears to have been sidelined from the Egyptian 
decision-making process. Nasser purposefully delayed an urgent request for a meeting by the 
Soviet Ambassador until after he had made the public announcement on the blockade.44 This 
indicates that Nasser wanted no Soviet interference with that decision. When they met, to the 
surprise of the Soviet official, Nasser shared the Egyptian government’s decision on navigation 
in the Gulf of Aqaba. For such a crucial and key decision in the crisis, the Soviet Union had not 
been consulted or informed in advance. Brezhnev made Soviet frustration clear when he told the 
Communist Party in a closed meeting shortly after the war ended that ‘our Government had not 
been informed beforehand of this action which had serious repercussions’.45 A US intelligence 
report described the Soviets as ‘taken by surprise’, noting the ‘absence of explicit expressions of 
support’ and that the reaction of the Soviet press was ‘muted’ and ‘delayed’.46 
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For his part, Nasser was aware that the Soviet Union was not enthusiastic about the escalation in 
the region, which might explain why Moscow was side-lined in the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, Nasser expected the Soviet Union to come around and support its key alley in the 
region. But Nasser’s expectations were unfulfilled, raising concerns in Cairo. Alarmed by the 
Soviet silence, Nasser asked the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow to raise his concerns with 
Soviet authorities and encourage them to take a more proactive approach. 47 The Soviet Union 
was slow to respond to Cairo’s pressure. It took Moscow more than a week to issue the statement 
that Egypt had been pushing for. Yet when the Soviet Ambassador presented the statement to 
Nasser, the Egyptian president was not impressed. The Ambassador explained that it was the 
strongest message of support that the Soviet Union could issue addressing a foreign policy issue, 
emphasising that it was co-signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the 
Soviet government. In response, Nasser told the Soviet Ambassador, ‘To be honest with you, this 
has been late coming. From the early days of the crisis we were expecting a word from you. We 
did not hear anything until we asked for it ourselves’.48 Lack of communication between the two 
allies compounded their different approaches to the crisis and bred frustrations between Cairo 
and Moscow.  
Consultations in Moscow 
 
Egypt’s decision to close the straits of Tiran in front of Israeli shipping started a new phase of the 
crisis. Israel had identified restrictions on its access to the Gulf of Aqaba as a casus belli. Cairo’s 
decision publicly crossed an Israeli red line and increased the chances of war. The day after 
Nasser’s announcement, Eshkol responded by stating that Nasser’s announcement was ‘an act of 
aggression’ against Israel.49 In light of rising tensions, Cairo and Moscow realised the need for 
extensive formal consultations. Consequently, a high-level Egyptian delegation headed by Shams 
Badran, War Minister, travelled to Moscow from the 25-28 May 1967 for that purpose. Sadat 
mentions in his memoirs that the visit came in response to a Soviet invitation.50 However, in an 
interview with Badran, he mentioned that it was Nasser who strategically pushed for the visit 
without a Soviet invitation, to give the impression that Egypt had the backing of the Soviet 
Union. 51  
 
Due to the military aspect of the crisis, the Egyptian delegation was predominantly comprised of 
military officials, with a small representation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Publicly 
available records of the meetings held by the delegation and its members’ testimony jointly 
provide a detailed and corroborated picture of Egyptian-Soviet consultations at a critical time in 
the crisis. Throughout the consultations, Soviet officials continuously urged Cairo to exercise 
restraint and voiced concerns over the escalation of regional tensions. The first meeting by the 
Egyptian delegation was with the high brass of the Soviet military in a dinner banquet hosted by 
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the Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Grechko. Badran described their hosts as ‘not at ease’ 
and ‘nervous about the situation we [Egyptians] created in the region.’52 They ‘did not want war 
to happen.’ 53 Over rounds of vodka, Soviet generals emphasized that it was not the right time for 
a military confrontation between the forces of capitalism and imperialism. It became clear to the 
Egyptian delegation that the Soviet military wanted to avoid being drawn into a military conflict 
in the Middle East. When an Egyptian diplomat mentioned that his son was serving in the army 
and ready to sacrifice his life for his country in a war against the US, the Soviets interpreted this 
as a sign of Egyptian adventurism and the meeting became tenser. In order to assure the Soviets, 
Badran mentioned that Egypt had no plans to either stop or attack US vessels passing through the 
Straits of Tiran and was not seeking military confrontation.54 
 
The first act of the consultations provided the template for the Egyptian delegation’s subsequent 
discussions in Moscow. Officials from the Soviet Union repeatedly tried to discern Egyptian 
motivations and intentions while expressing alarm at the prospect of a military confrontation. 
According to an Egyptian transcript of the meeting with Kosygin, the Soviet Premier asked 
detailed questions aimed at assessing the likelihood of war and understanding Cairo’s position. 
He inquired about the distribution of Egyptian troops, how close they were to Israeli positions, 
whether Cairo had planted maritime mines in the Gulf of Aqaba and Egypt’s long-term plans for 
navigation in the Gulf. He told the Egyptian delegation ,’Politically, you prevailed. Militarily 
you prevailed. What do you want now? My view is that what you achieved is enough. The 
Emergency Forces withdrew. You are in control of the Straits. Your troops are in Gaza. What 
more do you want?’55 
 
Meanwhile, Alexei Kosygin played a double game. On one hand, he did not want to alienate 
Moscow’s most significant regional ally in a time of crisis, and sought to assure Cairo of Soviet 
support. On the other hand, the Soviet Premier was very clear in requesting that Cairo avoid any 
provocation or further escalation of the crisis. He told the Egyptian delegation: 
 
I prefer discussions [diplomacy] instead of military confrontation . . . We 
think it important to take measures that give the enemy an image of your 
strength and not your weakness. From this position of strength, you will 
consolidate the success you achieved without the need to go into war. If 
you accepted this, then we are thinking along the same lines but if you 
have another point view please tell us. 
At various points in the discussion, Kosygin repeatedly made the case for restraint and de-
escalation by stressing that the Soviet Union was against war in the region. According to the 
Egyptian minutes of the meeting, he told the Egyptian delegation: 
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Avoiding war is in your interest as well as the interest of progressive 
forces in the world. We are not saying that because we are weak or 
afraid of war!! It is important to avoid circumstances that could lead to 
the outbreak of war. 
 
In response to this clear and overwhelming emphasis on restraint by the Soviet Premier, Badran 
followed a similar strategy to one he used in his meeting with the Soviet military. He made the 
case for the actions that the Egyptian government had taken in Sinai and Aqaba and was 
unequivocal in stressing Egypt’s resolve not to give up any gains it had made. He told the 
Soviets that Egypt ‘could not, under any circumstances, cede the positive outcomes achieved in 
Sharm El Sheikh or the Gulf of Aqaba because it was based on imperial aggression in 1956. We 
now returned to pre-1956’. However, at the same time, Badran continued to assure Soviet 
officials that Egypt ‘will not be the one to start war’. He also stressed that Cairo was keen to 
avoid a confrontation with the US, which the Egyptians felt was key to building trust with the 
Soviets and calming their anxieties. Badran told Kosygin that ‘if ships carrying the Israeli flag 
under the protection of American navy entered the Gulf [of Aqaba], we [Egypt] won’t interdict 
them’.56 But Cairo also wanted to have Soviet support in case the US decided to intervene 
militarily in support of Israel. Badran told Kosygin that ‘the Egyptian President wanted me to tell 
you that we are now in a confrontation with the US’. Cairo was still haunted by the memory of 
the 1956 Suez war, when it had faced Israel and the military might of two Western powers.  
 
The Soviets continued to send the same message to the Egyptian delegation, even in private 
discussions. In one instance, the Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Semyonov called his Egyptian 
counterpart for an informal meeting. Semyonov was highly regarded and trusted in Cairo as a 
friendly voice in the Soviet establishment. In that discussion, Semyonov strongly pleaded that 
Egypt should not start a war. He said that the Soviet Union had no appetite for fighting a world 
war; to impress the point on his Egyptian counterpart, he mentioned that the ‘Soviet Union was 
no match to the United States’.57 He tried to explain the seriousness of interfering with the 
principles of freedom of navigation, citing Soviet ships’ reliance on these principles in their use 
of the Bosphorus Straits.58 Semyonov’s private message reinforced that which the Soviets were 
imparting in the formal consultations. According to Ghaleb, the Soviets were trying through ‘all 
the different means’ to drive the point home clearly to the Egyptian delegation that they were not 
supportive of escalation and that they did not want to see an armed confrontation in the Middle 
East.59  
 
In terms of external optics, the Egyptians may have achieved what they wanted from their visit to 
Moscow: three days of high-level meetings in the public eye with a superpower, at the height of 
a serious regional crisis. Nasser was keen to capitalise on the visit and in its aftermath publicly 
praised the Soviet Union as a ‘friend’ for ‘standing with us’.60 The reality, however, was that the 
series of meetings held in the Soviet Union showed how anxious and nervous Soviet leadership 
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was regarding the prospect of regional escalation or being drawn into war in the Middle East. 
Was Nasser aware of the reality of the Soviet position? As the Egyptian delegation was leaving 
Moscow, Greshko reportedly assured Bardran in the airport ‘not to worry’, and that the Soviet 
navy was not far away from the region.61 Some argue that Nasser may have been misled by 
Badran’s comprehension of Grechko’s remarks. However, it is hard to see how Nasser could not 
have been aware of the clearly stated positions the Soviet Union repeatedly expressed during the 
consultations. Detailed records of the meetings of the delegation, now publicly available, clearly 
reflect the Soviet desire to avoid war. In addition to Badran’s report, Nasser was independently 
briefed by Ambassador Ghaleb and Ambassador Elfiki on the visit, including on the private 
discussion with Semyonov.62 It is more likely that Nasser had little doubt about the Soviet 
position yet knowingly sought to give the impression that it was solidly behind Egypt during the 
crisis to deter Israel. This is supported by an interview given by Ghaleb in which he recounted a 
meeting with Nasser three weeks after the war. Ghaleb asked Nasser, ‘Who were you counting 
on in the war? the Soviets? I sent all the cables for our consultations and [: including] with 
Kosygin.’ Nasser replied: ‘No, we were not counting on the Soviets’, indicating that he was well 
informed about the Soviet reluctance to get involved in the conflict.63 This theory is also 
supported by Badran, who believes that Nasser wanted to draw the Soviets into the crisis after 
the decision about navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba was taken.64  
Egyptian-Soviet arms wrestling 
 
Another facet of Egyptian-Soviet relations during the crisis took the form of discussions around 
arms and military hardware. Egypt had relied on Soviet arms since 1955.65 This initially took the 
form of arms deals using Czechoslovakia as an intermediary, then through open and direct 
dealings following the 1956 Suez War.66 Over the years, Nasser mastered playing one pole of the 
Cold War against the other and, in the process, benefited from both. Soviet interest in gaining 
influence in the Middle East and placating Cairo meant that Egypt had privileged access to 
Soviet military hardware, surpassing that of other non-communist states on friendly terms with 
Moscow. Deals for Soviet arms were usually made under generous financial terms and 
sometimes even in exchange for Egyptian commodities, including cotton.67 With the growth of 
their military relations, Cairo kept a significant military attaché office in Moscow that 
coordinated the busy flow of hardware, military trainers, and officers between both countries.  
 
As the crisis began to heat up, the Egyptian military began to make fresh demands for military 
hardware. Gaps in armaments became particularly pressing after the reserves were called in and 
new military units were formed to deploy in Sinai; this was compounded by the frequent shifts in 
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Egyptian military plans. 68 Egyptian military planners also started to make fresh requests for new 
and advanced anti-aircraft missiles to strengthen their weak air defences. To meet these 
demands, Cairo turned to the Soviet Union. The Egyptian delegation flying to Moscow carried 
with them a list of needed military hardware which they hoped, particularly in a time of crisis, 
that their Soviet ally would be able to supply. The Soviet Union, however, proved to be very 
cautious on the issue of supplying arms and reluctant to give the Egyptian military access to 
everything it needed. The result was a deadlock in Egyptian-Soviet negotiations in Moscow. 
Marshal Grechko insisted that the arms that the Egyptian military already had were sufficient in 
quantity, as well as effective, citing their successful use in Vietnam.69 These arguments were not 
convincing to Egyptian military officials, who instinctively rejected comparing their military 
needs with the needs of asymmetrical guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia. According to Badran, 
the Soviet Union went so far as to deny that they even possessed some of the arms Egypt was 
requesting. Soviet refusal extended to spare parts needed by Cairo to maintain its Soviet arsenal 
and that Badran thought would be less controversial and could be easily provided and transported 
back to Cairo with the delegation. Key driving factor behind Soviet reluctance was the desire to 
avoid an escalation of tension and the fear of encouraging Egyptian adventurism. 
 
To circumvent the Soviets’ unwillingness to supply arms, the Egyptian delegation pursued 
several tactics. While in Moscow, the delegation sent an urgent message to Nasser and Amer, 
reporting Soviet reluctance to meet Egypt’s arms requests and asking them to apply direct 
pressure from Cairo on Soviet leadership. The delegation also resorted to emotional blackmail. 
Badran told Soviet officials that if he failed to secure the arms Egypt needed, he would be court-
martialled upon his return to Cairo.70 Ultimately, Egyptian pressure succeeded in lessening 
Soviet resistance, even if some of the promises made during the visit were not fulfilled. Moscow 
agreed to expedite deliveries of delayed arms and committed to fulfilling some of Egypt’s new 
requests. As Kosygin jokingly told Badran, ‘the [Soviet Communist] party decided to spare you a 
tribunal’.71 Kosygin insisted that any arms shipments provided to Cairo were meant to 
‘consolidate peace’ by projecting strength and explained that ‘the Soviet objective is to ensure 
that armed conflict would not take place’. For his part, Badran confirmed that Egypt ‘does not 
seek war at all and it is in its interest to freeze the situation as it is’. 
 
But when it came to arms, Moscow’s words spoke louder than its actions. The items that the 
Egyptian military really cared about remained off-limits, including the spare parts for MiG 
fighters and mobile low-altitude air defence that were desperately needed in Cairo.72 When it 
came to the delivery of what Moscow had agreed to provide, the Egyptians constantly felt that 
the Soviet Union was dragging its feet and stalling. After a number of delays, the Soviet 
Ambassador informed Nasser that some of the promised Soviet arms would be airlifted to Egypt 
on a schedule starting the 9th of June (the war started on the 5th). A frustrated Nasser sarcastically 
countered that these deliveries might as well be sent by sea rather than the much faster air 
																																								 																				
68 Fawzī, Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970, 50–51; Murtaji, Al-Farīq Murtajī Yarwī Al-Hạqā’iq. 
69 Badran, Shams. Unpublished memoirs. Undated. In Arabic 
70 Memorandum of first meeting Kosygin-Badran. 26 June 1967  
71 Memorandum of second meeting between Soviet Prime Minister Alexie Kosygin and War Minister Shams 
Badran. 27 May 1967 produced in full in Huwaidi. Al-furas Aldha’a. (Beirut: Sherket Al-matbou’at lil Twaze’ W al-
Nashr) 1992, 570-582 
72 Badran, Shams. Unpublished memoirs. Undated. In Arabic   
17	
	
route.73 According to Badran, Egypt did not receive any significant deliveries of Soviet arms 
before during the crisis because the Soviets ‘did not want to get involved or did not want us to 
fight.’74 With regards to arms, what was felt in Cairo was a series of hesitations, half measures 
and delays from their Soviet ally.  
Hold your fire 
 
The last few days before the start of the war saw both Egypt and the Soviet Union approaching 
their relationship differently than they had at the beginning of the crisis. The high-level meetings 
held by the Egyptian delegation in Moscow were followed by close consultations and messages 
between Cairo and Moscow. The Egyptian records for these consultations have not been made 
public yet, but their substance can be traced through memoirs and interviews. These discussions 
saw the continuation of earlier positions expressed by both sides during their consultations in 
Moscow. Soviet officials continued to counsel restraint and discourage Cairo from any action 
that would further escalate tensions. Egyptian officials responded by denying any hint of war 
with Israel. Heikal describes an urgent message delivered by the Soviet Ambassador to Nasser in 
the early hours of the morning of the 27th of May. The motivation for the urgent message was 
information that the United States shared with Moscow suggesting that Cairo was considering 
launching a military offensive against Israel. The US urged Moscow to promptly raise the issue 
with Cairo and quickly avert any such possibility. Moscow, consistent with its insistence on 
restraint, asked Dimitri Pojidaev, the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt, to seek a prompt meeting 
with Nasser. Pojidaev asked Cairo not to open hostilities, stating that the USSR ‘did not want to 
leave anything to chance’.75 Pojidaev told Nasser if such an attack materialised, ‘the US would 
absolve itself from any commitment to restraint that it had given to the USSR’. The message was 
clear to Nasser. The Soviet Union was in agreement with the US; both were adamant that Egypt 
should desist from any military operations.  
 
Nasser did not push back against Soviet calls urging Cairo not to be the first to attack. In the last 
days of the crisis, he wanted to avoid a risky military operation that might detract from the gains 
he had made at the start of the crisis or draw US military intervention into the region. He told the 
Soviet Ambassador that ‘Egypt does not want war but it will defend itself if attacked’.76 But 
while Nasser wanted to avoid war, some elements in the Egyptian armed forces were pushing for 
an Egyptian offensive. This included the commander of the air force, Sidqi Mahmoud. More 
importantly, it also included the chief of the armed forces, Marshal Amer, who was willing to 
entertain a more adventurous course. However, Nasser had dismissed proposals of an Egyptian 
offensive early on; the US and Soviet messages only reinforced his position and drove him to put 
tighter reins on his military. Ultimately, nobody in the Egyptian command chose to openly 
challenge Nasser’s strategy, including Amer, who dropped his support for the offensive and 
remained loyal to his long-time associate and friend, Nasser.77  
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Until the outbreak of war, the Soviet Union had been engaged in efforts aimed at ensuring that 
war would not break out in the Middle East. Recent testimonies from former Soviet officials 
have uncovered behind-the-scene-efforts to arrange a secret meeting between Nasser and Eshkol 
in Moscow that would have paved the way towards a diplomatic end to the crisis. Both leaders 
were invited to Moscow for a hastily organised meeting to discuss how to resolve the crisis. The 
meeting, scheduled for the 2nd of June, never took place, despite Soviet efforts to reach out to 
Arab and Israeli leaders. Nasser initially agreed to the secret meeting, describing the proposal as 
‘wise’ and claiming that he ‘fully shared’ Soviet objectives, adding that after such meeting, 
‘Israel’s conduct would be calmer’.78 However, Nasser later backpedalled and rejected the 
invitation. According to Primakov and Kotov, Nasser was influenced by Syria’s strong rejection 
of the initiative.79 After consulting with the Syrian President and Prime Minister, he mentioned 
he could not attend such a meeting ‘without Syria’s consent’. 80 With Nasser’s rejection, the 
proposal ultimately fell flat.  
 
The Israeli attack ultimately came as a surprise to both Cairo and Moscow, who had hoped that 
time would diffuse the crisis. In Cairo, the start of war made Moscow’s position difficult. 
Throughout the crisis, the Soviet Union had repeatedly asked Egypt for restraint and to avoid a 
first strike. Now Israel had taken the initiative, with dramatic consequences. Cairo felt that it had 
held up its side of the bargain by holding fire and had been let down by the Soviet Union. As the 
scale of Egyptian losses became clear, questions regarding the role of the Soviet Union were 
raised, particularly within the Egyptian military. An emotional Amer called in the Soviet 
Ambassador to the Egyptian High Military Command and accused Moscow of being complicit in 
the attack against the Egyptian forces.81 In Moscow, the Egyptian ambassador received angry 
cables from Cairo placing the responsibility of the Israeli attacks on the Soviet Union.82  
Conclusion 
 
Many theories on the origins of the 1967 Middle East war are built on assumptions regarding 
Egyptian-Soviet relations during the crisis preceding that war. This article primarily draws on 
Egyptian and Arabic-language sources to examine the interactions between Cairo and Moscow 
during this critical period of the region’s history. In doing so, the article presents new aspects of 
this relationship and how it unfolded during the crisis. It demonstrates how Egypt and the Soviet 
Union went into this crisis with little coordination or agreement on common objectives or goals. 
Furthermore, frustration and mutual disappointment were recurring features of their relationship. 
The image that emerges here is one that challenges revisionist accounts attributing the start of the 
war to Egyptian-Soviet collusion, as well as certain traditional narratives that present the Soviet 
Union as an enterprising risk-taker invested in regional brinkmanship.  
  
Both capitals had good reasons to be alarmed by the rise of tensions on the Israeli-Syrian border. 
They worried about the vulnerability of the Syrian government and did not trust Israeli 
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intensions. However, they did not initially see eye-to-eye on how to react to these tensions. 
While Moscow had been privately urging caution, Cairo single-handedly took the initiative to 
embark on a series of escalatory moves that brought Egypt to the cusp of war. In the process, 
each country failed to appropriately assess the position of the other. The Soviet Union did not 
accurately read the pressure on Nasser to respond to Israel’s public threats to Syria and his 
sensitivity about his regional standing. Nor did Moscow seem to appreciate Egypt’s longstanding 
grievances about the status quo in Sinai after the 1956 war. Cairo, on the other hand, expected 
Moscow to come around in support of its fait accompli, underestimating both Soviet 
cautiousness and its commitment to détente with the US.  
 
The result was mutual disappointment in both Cairo and Moscow. The Soviet Union was 
frustrated that its early calls for restraint were not heeded. Cairo was confused by the lax Soviet 
attitude during the crisis and was disappointed with the level of support the Soviet Union was 
ready to offer. After Nasser’s early brinkmanship had run its course, both Cairo and Moscow 
began to agree on the importance of restraint and war avoidance. The Soviet Union strongly 
urged Nasser not to authorise a first strike on Israel. Nasser already sceptical about the benefits 
of an Egyptian offensive and found in Soviet and US positions further validation that the best 
course of action would be to curb any such impulses in his military and opt to buy time during 
which tensions could deflate.  
 
These findings shed new light on the origins of the 1967 war and challenge frequent assumptions 
that depict Egypt and the Soviet Union as trigger-happy and either pushing for or conspiring to 
initiate a regional war. Furthermore, the dysfunctional aspects of Egyptian-Soviet relations 
during a time of regional crisis invite wider reflections into the nature, timeline, and trajectory of 
relations between Cairo and Moscow. These relations did much to shape the Middle East during 
the Cold War, but Cairo and Moscow did not prove to be each other’s best allies when their 
relationship mattered most. Their interactions were mired in mistrust, lack of co-ordination, and 
many miscommunications during a regional crisis that would ultimately shape the region for 
decades to come. 
 
In the end, the war painfully exposed the limitations of the Egyptian-Soviet friendship. For many 
in the Egyptian establishment, the 1967 defeat was not only a military one, but also extended to 
Egypt’s international alliances and particularly to its ties with the Soviet Union. However, the 
relationship between Cairo and Moscow did not unravel immediately after the war. In fact, 
Egypt’s reliance on the Soviet Union, particularly as a source of arms, increased. But this proved 
to be only temporary. Following Egyptian troops’ successful crossing into Sinai in the 1973 war, 
Egypt turned its back on its strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and sought a place in the 
US orbit. The 1967 war can thus be considered a watershed moment in Egyptian-Soviet 
relations, planting the seeds for the countries’ later divergence.  
 
Bibliography 
 
Aronson, S. “Israel’s Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and Its Ramifications.” Israel Affairs 
6, no. 3–4 (2000): 83–95. 
Bennett, Alexander J. “Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.” The 
Middle East Journal, 1985, 745–774. 
20	
	
Bunch, Clea Lutz. “Strike at Samu: Jordan, Israel, the United States, and the Origins of the Six-
Day War.” Diplomatic History 32, no. 1 (2008): 55–76. 
Cohen, Avner. “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War.” Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (April 1, 
1996): 190–210. 
Little, Douglas. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. Univ 
of North Carolina Press, 2008. 
 
Fawzī, Muḥammad. Ḥarb al-thalāth sanawāt, 1967/1970: mudhakkirāt al-Farīq Awwal 
Muḥammad Fawzī, Wazīr al-Ḥarbīyah al-Asbaq. al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Mustaqbal al-ʻArabī, 1986. 
Ferris, Jesse. “Guns for Cotton? Aid, Trade, and the Soviet Quest for Base Rights in Egypt, 
1964–1966.” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 2 (2011): 4–38. 
Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the 
Six-Day War. Yale University Press, 2008. 
Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. “The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona: 
The USSR’s Motive for Instigating the Six-Day War.” Israel Studies 11, no. 2 (2006): 88–130. 
Golan, Galia. “A (Dubious) Conspiracy Theory of the 1967 War.” Diplomatic History 32, no. 4 
(September 1, 2008): 669–73. 
Golan, Galia. “The Soviet Union and the Outbreak of the June 1967 Six-Day War.” Journal of 
Cold War Studies 8, no. 1 (2006): 3–19. 
Heikal, Muhạmmad Hạsanayn. Al-Infijar, 1967. Hạrb Al-Thalāthīn Sanah. Markaz al-Ahrām lil-
Tarjamah wa-al-Nashr, 1990. 
Huwaidi. Al-furas Aldha’a. (Beirut: Sherket Al-matbou’at lil Twaze’ W al-Nashr) 1992 
Huwayidi. Adhwa’ ‘ala Naksa w Iztenzaf’ (Beirut: Dar Eltalya), 1975	
Kolander, Kenny. “The 1967 Arab–Israeli War: Soviet Policy by Other Means?” Middle Eastern 
Studies 52, no. 3 (2016): 402–418. 
Laron, Guy. Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 
Czechoslovak Arms Deal. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2007. 
Laron, Guy. “Playing with Fire: The Soviet–Syrian–Israeli Triangle, 1965–1967.” Cold War 
History 10, no. 2 (2010): 163–184. 
Laron, Guy. The Six Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East. Yale University Press, 2017. 
21	
	
Morris, Benny. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998. New 
York; London: Random House, 1999. 
Murtaji, ʻAbd al-Muhsin Kamil. Al-Farīq Murtajī Yarwī Al-Hạqā’iq : Qaʻid Jabhat Sinā’ Fī 
Hạrb 1967. [Beirut] : al-Waṭan al-ʻArabī, 1970. 
Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War: The June 1967 War and the Creation of the Modern Middle 
East. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Pajak, Roger F. “Soviet Arms and Egypt.” Survival 17, no. 4 (1975): 165–173. 
Parker, Richard B. “The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored.” Middle East Journal 46, 
no. 2 (1992): 177–197. 
Parker, Richard B. The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East. Georgetown University 
Press, 1993. 
 
Parker, Richard B. The Six-Day War: A Retrospective. University Press of Florida, 1996. 
 
Primakov, Yevgeny. Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold 
War to the Present. Basic Books, 2009. 
Rikhye, Indar Jit. The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force 
Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967. Psychology Press, 1980. 
Riyāḍ, Maḥmūd. Mudhakkirāt Maḥmūd Rīyāḍ (1948-1978): [al-baḥth ʻan al-salām. wa-al-ṣirāʻ 
fī al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ. al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Mustaqbal al-ʻArabī, 1986. 
Ro’i, Yaacov, and Boris Morozov. The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War. 
Washington, D.C.; Stanford, Calif.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Stanford University Press, 
2008. 
Sadat, Anwar. Al-Bahṭh ʻan Al-Dhāt : Qisṣạt Hạyātī /. al-Qāhirah : al-Maktab al-Misṛī al-Hạdīth, 
1978. 
Shlaim, Avi. “The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars.” In Explaining International 
Relations Since 1945, 219–240, 1996. 
Ziser, Eyal. “June 1967: Israel’s Capture of the Golan Heights.” Israel Studies 7, no. 1 (2002): 
168–194. 
 
